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Abstract-Government technology development programs are 
proving difficult to deliver on time and on budget, a consequence 
of the complexity inherent in both the technology and the 
acquisition environment. This paper advocates the development 
of new governance and management models for such programs, 
as well as new thinking about how to compare these models. It 
also highlights the need for increased flexibility and resiliency 
(F&R) within organizations (both public and private) to better 
prepare them for governing and managing such complex 




Complex defense and network-centric systems, such as the 
Army’s Future Combat Systems, the Coast Guard’s Integrated 
Deepwater System and the FAA’s Next Generation Air Traffic 
System, are far more ambitious than any previously attempted 
by the U.S. government. Successfully managing these 
complex programs is vital, because they are designed to 
provide the core of many critical future government 
capabilities and citizen services. 
 
Such systems are difficult to develop and oversee. The 
programs are designed before the technologies they 
incorporate actually exist. They are implemented by teams of 
government managers and industry practitioners, aided by a 
vast assemblage of engineering and scientific talent, overseen 
by political forces, monitored by auditors at every step, 
regulated by rules measured in linear feet, and ultimately 
evaluated in what are often life-or-death situations. This is 
difficult work. Governance and management techniques 
struggle to keep up as complexity blossoms, often resulting in 
blown budgets and missed schedules. Cost and schedule 
overruns result from the overwhelming difficulty of creating 
systems comprised of thousands of elements, addressing 
dozens or hundreds of requirements, produced by multiple 
manufacturers, under the direction of one of a handful of 
prime contractors. 
 
A recent CSIS book [1] put forward several models for 
rethinking the policy framework in which complex programs 
are developed. Yet the fact that problems appear regardless of 
the program management mechanisms in use implies that the 
solution may lie elsewhere. We argue that successful 
governance of complex programs requires the ability to 
recognize and adapt to the challenges complexity poses.  
 
We posit that government policy makers, in their efforts to 
select the right model to govern a complex technology 
development program, should focus less on making the right 
choice and more on ensuring that whatever option they do 
select can successfully identify, survive and respond to 
changes. In any complex program, changes are inevitable in 
user requirements, program scope, budget, external political 
demands and the operating environment. The impact of these 
changes is hard to anticipate, because of the complexity 
inherent in the program and its environment. And these 
impacts can best be handled within a policy framework that 
embodies flexibility and resilience. We are not recommending 
a model. Rather, we are recommending an organizational way 
of life – attributes that an organization must have, if it is to be 
able to govern and manage complex programs successfully.   
 
This paper describes the challenges complexity brings to 
government technology development programs, highlights the 
need for a way to assess and compare governance models, and 
shows how the challenge of picking the right model can be 
mitigated by ensuring that the model incorporates flexibility 
and resilience. We define flexibility and resilience as the 
ability to recognize, absorb and react to changes in the 
development environment. We then suggest ways to achieve 
flexibility and resilience.  
 
II. COMPLEXITY DEFINED 
 
It is easy to confuse “complex” with “complicated.” 
Programs that seem complex to many observers are often 
better labeled complicated. Complicated systems are 
characterized by their large scale and by a multitude of 
moving parts or actors that are highly dynamic, that constantly 
interact with and affect one another, and that behave primarily 
in a linear fashion. Complicated programs are relatively 
common and can be managed to successful delivery by 
decomposing the program into subprojects and then using 
systems engineering techniques to identify and resolve 
(integrate) interdependencies across subproject boundaries.  
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Complex programs, on the other hand, are non-linear and 
are comprised of multiple, interrelated elements that interact 
unpredictably. Even an in-depth familiarity with each of these 
elements does not impart an understanding of the system as a 
whole. Complex programs are characterized by nonlinear 
feedback loops and recursiveness. They are sensitive to small 
differences in initial conditions, and in their emergent phase 
this significantly inhibits the validity of any detailed long-term 
planning. They are often implemented in highly pluralist 
environments where multiple and divergent views exist at both 
the technical level and in management. Finally, it is a 
fundamental characteristic of complex systems that the 
interplay of the various elements brings unique additional 
capability. Therefore, complex systems cannot be 
deconstructed to their constituent elements; doing so would 
remove the added value that results when the systems 
integration function is undertaken. 
 
Historically, there has always been a tension between the 
increasing complexity of new technologies and the policy 
frameworks that govern them, yet often lag behind their 
development. The recent track record indicates that the 
government’s existing management and integration tools no 
longer suffice for large-scale, horizontally-integrated complex 
programs. Current approaches were developed years ago in an 
environment where the government customer was technically 
astute and worked closely with one vertically integrated 
contractor per program. Today, the government customer is 
less savvy in matters of technology and less well-staffed in 
terms of workforce. Moreover, the contracts for a typical 
program are executed by a network of firms, often spanning 
continents and sharing responsibility for managing cost, 
schedule and risk. Companies and even governments may 
simultaneously be partners and competitors, and it is a 
sensitive issue to even share information, much less to 
integrate it. Most importantly, this government inability to 
adapt policies and governance mechanisms to innovations in 
hardware and services often constrains the societal benefits 
from these innovations [2]. 
 
III. ORGANIZING FOR COMPLEXITY: A CONSTANT 
STRUGGLE 
 
The federal government’s ability to bring complex 
programs to fruition depends first and foremost on effective 
governance. In the past, great engineering successes resulted 
not only from technical excellence but also from superior 
project management and governance structures. Today, 
complex programs require that many external elements and 
activities, such as the bureaucratic politics of coordinating a 
large number of interlinked organizations, be internalized. 
Integrating external and internal elements is part of what 
makes complex programs dynamic, non-linear and risk-
intensive. This integration also presents significant policy and 
governance challenges.  
 
With changing technological and commercial 
environments, program management models have evolved 
over the years, from the government-owned arsenal of the 19th 
century to the recent Lead System Integrator (LSI) approach 
embraced by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for some 
of its major development programs. Responsibility for 
requirements definition, program management and technical 
execution has increasingly shifted away from government and 
toward the private sector (see Table I below). This trend 
resulted from reasonable efforts to reap the benefits of 
competition in both innovation and economics.   
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a Source: H. Sapolsky, “Models for Governing Large Systems Projects”, in Organizing for a Complex World: Developing Tomorrow’s 
Defense and Net-Centric Systems, G. Ben-Ari and P. Chao, Eds. Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009, p. 26.
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However, the shift of responsibility to the 
private sector has been accompanied by a decline 
in overall government expertise and capability. In 
fact, during the past two decades, the capability 
and capacity of the federal government for systems 
integration has been dramatically reduced. At the 
height of the Cold War, defense systems 
commands (such as the Naval Air Systems 
Command or the Air Force Systems Command) 
combined military, civilian, and outside personnel 
to build and manage large systems. Assistance with 
systems-of-systems integration was the purview of 
research centers and government labs. But at the 
end of the 1980s, the DoD began a long period of 
steady downsizing of the acquisitions workforce, 
and the expertise to manage complex acquisitions 
began to wither. The impact of the reduced staff 
numbers during the 1990s was not immediately 
apparent, as the pace of defense procurement in the 
post-Cold War world was slower and less urgent 
than before. The need for certification of new 
systems or examination of new standards was low. 
As a result, many of the design engineers and 
technicians employed by certifying organizations 
to develop and evaluate criteria for construction 
and design standards retired and were not replaced 
[3]. 
 
Recent experience confirms the difficulty of 
managing complex system development programs 
to time and budget. For example, since 2000, the 
DoD has significantly increased the number of 
major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and 
its overall investment in them, but the track record 
of delivering on cost and schedule remains uneven. 
In a 2009 analysis of select DoD weapon programs, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
found that for the fiscal year 2008 portfolio of 
MDAPs, total acquisition costs increased 25 
percent and development costs increased by 42 
percent, compared to initial estimates. Both 
increases are greater than the corresponding 
increases for programs in the fiscal year 2000 
portfolio. GAO analysis also found that on average, 
fiscal year 2008 programs delivered initial 
capabilities to the warfighter 22 months behind 
schedule, a 6-month increase compared to fiscal 
year 2000 programs. Continued cost growth results 
in less available funding for other DoD priorities 
and programs, while continued failure to deliver 
weapon systems on time delays providing critical 
capabilities to the military [4].  
 
In directing programs that have been 
problematic, managers for the government, the 
prime contractors, and the commercial 
subcontractors shared one common feature: they 
underestimated the complexity of requirements, 
integration of subsystems, and the interaction of 
changes in one subsystem that place new demands 
on others [5]. That is, while programs go awry for 
varied reasons, problematic programs have in 
common their inability to address the complexity 
challenge effectively. 
 
IV. THINKING ABOUT A SOLUTION: 
MEASURING SUCCESS 
 
As described above, complexity is first and 
foremost a governance and management problem. 
In today’s globalized knowledge economy, the 
speed of change in technology and society has 
outpaced the ability of public policy and 
government organizations to learn, adapt, and 
respond. As complexity becomes a greater 
challenge, such solutions are less easy to find. 
 
Despite several efforts to identify innovative 
governance alternatives, there is no known or 
identified method to assess any of them ex ante. 
Therefore, it has been difficult for managers to 
compare potential solutions and to assess whether a 
given policy or governance framework will have 
the desired effect.  
 
Ultimately, the program governance and 
management challenges – and the value brought by 
a good systems-of-systems integrator – lies in 
helping the government make tradeoff decisions. 
How can we measure this ability? Making tradeoffs 
requires broad access to knowledge, not only about 
technology but also about government needs and 
relative priorities, across all potentially applicable 
systems and subsystems and all components and 
specialties. Access to knowledge can, in fact, be 
measured, though doing so is a demanding 
challenge. The number of systems, subsystems and 
components and specialties are known (or at least 
knowable), and whether they are known can be 
documented and measured with considerable 
precision. As such, by measuring the degree of 
access to relevant information, it is possible to 
compare different governance and management 
models against one another.  
 
This ability to measure suggests one possible 
approach. Stable teams of talented scientists and 
engineers can be assessed in each of their access-
to-knowledge categories (systems, subsystems, 
components, technologies). Those measures can be 
both relative (i.e., comparing government labs, 
R&D centers, and private contractors) and absolute 
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(Do we have enough? Is everything covered?). 
While this approach is input-oriented and assumes 
that better access to relevant information will lead 
to better outcomes, it allows the comparing and 
relative ranking of competing organizations or 
management structures. It also allows comparison 
over time. Eventually, a baseline standard can 
emerge. 
 
Based on the premise that the clash of ideas – 
and the evaluation of tradeoffs among those ideas – 
really does lead to better solutions, the measures 
above may also support an assessment of who can 
do a better job of systems-of-systems integration. 
By measuring who has better access to knowledge, 
we can identify who can better foster that clash of 
ideas and the corresponding tradeoffs. Such a 
process could move the choice of program 
governance and management structure from one of 
emotion and philosophy to one of analysis and 
metrics. This approach offers the promise of such a 
process. 
 
V. ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND 
RESILIENCE: KEYS TO A SOLUTION 
 
Some direction can also be found by 
considering what must happen for a program to 
meet schedule and budget objectives: 
 
• User requirements must be gathered and 
assembled into a complete, comprehensible 
specification or a Request for Proposal (RFP).  
 
• Potential bidders must be able first to 
understand that specification or RFP and then 
to submit bids that allow fair compensation 
and share risk reasonably.  
 
• Government analysts need to compare bids, 
applying their expertise and experience to 
identify and reject unrealistic assumptions.  
 
• End users must have input to tradeoffs across 
capability, schedule and budget.  
 
Once a contract has been awarded and 
execution begins, design changes must be 
integrated appropriately. Realistic assessments 
about progress and potential must be made, and 
ways found to manage newly encountered 
tradeoffs. Unanticipated events will happen, and 
success will hinge on how well the chosen program 
management and governance frameworks react to 
the unexpected. The measurement of access to 
knowledge outlined in the previous section does 
not help us assess an organization’s ability to 
respond to change; we must seek that elsewhere. 
 
By looking at successful private sector 
examples, we can see some elements of a 
potentially successful approach. One typical such 
approach to addressing complexity is to improve 
the ability of an organization to understand change 
in its environment and respond to it by becoming a 
“learning organization.” Such organizations 
ultimately bring about their own continuing 
transformation [6]. Successful innovators in 
dynamic industries, such as IBM, 3M, Goldman 
Sachs, and Google, have institutional and 
organizational structures that enable them to adapt 
quickly to changing commercial conditions. 
Having honed organizational characteristics that 
allow them to change course quickly, they tolerate 
false starts and the accompanying waste. They 
devote resources to learning, pursue what works 
and abandon what does not, spend less time 
planning for everything in advance, and do not 
execute the plan regardless of what is learned along 
the way. These attributes amount to making the 
organization more capable of handling unexpected 
situations, by accepting that they will occur and 
trying to make the organization more resilient.  
 
The same is true in government technology 
development programs, where complexity entails 
unpredictable, rapid changes. Increasing the 
system’s flexibility and resilience (F&R) enables it 
to successfully absorb and react to changes, 
problems and opportunities. We define F&R as the 
ability to recognize, survive and respond to 
changes. In practical terms, this means the 
organization must recognize, understand and react 
to internal and external developments. The 
organization must be acutely aware, from the 
lowest to the highest levels, of changes in the 
external environment (user needs, the operating 
environment, relevant doctrine, etc.) and the impact 
of those changes internally and on the program in 
question. An awareness of the internal environment 
– the details of the production and design cycle, 
technological or engineering developments that 
might threaten budget or schedule commitments, 
etc. – is also necessary. Managers and employees 
at all levels must be empowered to communicate 
their conclusions about perceived changes and the 
impact of those changes and to take appropriate 
action. 
 
Flexible and resilient programs must have 
management and leadership – including political 
overseers – that is willing to tolerate a certain 
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amount of failure, a certain number of false starts, 
and spending that sometimes appears to be less 
than completely efficient. Program management 
and the accompanying contracting process need to 
focus on accountability, sometimes at the perceived 
sacrifice of efficiency. We contend that coping 
with complexity puts a premium on F&R, and 
some sacrifice of apparent efficiency is necessary 
in order to get greater benefits of on-time and on-
budget delivery.   
 
Can the government create such organizations? 
Successfully instituting F&R will require 
significant changes in the culture of acquisition and 
program management organizations. Training will 
be needed so employees understand the big picture 
and make their piece of the small picture work 
better. Management needs to cultivate some level 
of tolerance for error and be willing to grant the 
necessary autonomy and authority for decision-
making at lower levels. Systems across the 
organization must be designed to allow widespread 
sharing of information, including possibly sensitive 
data. The organization must also gather external 
information and disseminate it widely, to allow the 
ranking and prioritization of system attributes that 
allow tradeoffs to be made more easily. An effort 
should be made to reduce bureaucratic barriers to 
efficiency, such as extremely tight budget controls 
or overly stringent documentation requirements. 
Most importantly, incentives should be aligned 
throughout the organization to encourage and 
reward desired behaviors. 
 
The attractiveness of F&R attributes lies in 
their ability to be applied regardless of what overall 
management approach is chosen. Focusing on F&R 
in existing organizations is a way to side-step the 
discussion over choosing the “perfect” 
management model from among the private sector, 
a Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center (FFRDC), University Affiliated Research 
Centers (UARCs), or a government laboratory. 
Traditionally, such a model would be chosen by 
analyzing the project, selecting a management 
model, then hoping that the choice was correct. 
Instead, F&R offers an approach that should work 
regardless of what challenges are encountered, 
because F&R is itself is a model of adapting to 
complexity, of embracing it and being ready for the 
pitfalls and opportunities it offers. 
 
Each of the three organization types at the 
government’s disposal possesses F&R to some 
degree (see Table II). Let’s look at each in turn. 
 
First, FFRDCs and UARCs have proven that 
they can be flexible in managing technical teams in 
dynamic environments and sustaining them over 
time, even when those teams were taksed with 
different types of projects demanding a wide array 
of skills. UARCs and FFRDCs sustain the 
institutional functions needed to house technical 
expertise. They provide the matrixed integration to 
bring that array of technical knowledge and 
expertise to bear in a systems-of-systems 
architecture approach. As a result, they can more 
easily provide a broader reach across technical 
areas, integrating multiple disciplines under a 
single pursuit. This flexibility to reach across 
disciplines may become more significant in the 
future, as government missions are clarified in new 
technology areas. Further, UARCs and FFRDCs 
have the flexibility to attract and retain top talent. 
 
Several elements make FFRDCs and UARCs 
particularly resilient: their independence, the 
absence of even the appearance of conflict of 
interest, the protection of proprietary information, 
and the provision of equal access to all potential 
interested and qualified parties (public and private). 
FFRDCs and UARCs have a lower rate of 
employee turnover, contributing to the institutions' 
historical memory and ability to promise steady 
configuration-control procedures. However, 
FFRDCs, with dedicated budget line items, while 
less driven to take on customers regardless of how 
their work fits into institutional priorities, may 
become sluggish or too responsive to the ‘expected 
answer’ phenomena because of the line item 
funding. (This is less true of UARCs, with no 
dedicated funding line.) 
 
Second, government labs and engineering 
centers exhibit F&R to a lesser degree. One reason 
for this is their link to a specific government 
sponsor, a relationship that sometimes exhibits 
tension. The lab or center may feel that the sponsor 
ignores their priorities and feeds its own larger 
goals, while the sponsor may feel that the lab or 
center does the same in reverse, that is, ignores 
sponsor goals to keep doing what the lab and its 
leadership consider more worthwhile. In other 
words, government sponsors may see labs as less 
responsive and flexible. This is particularly 
important if the sponsors rely on their researchers 
to help them be smart buyers. 
 
Furthermore, government sponsors tend to 
believe that scientists should support their 
immediate needs for advice on particular 
acquisition programs and for quick fixes to get 
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equipment working for upcoming deployments, 
even if the solutions are temporary, non-
systematic, and non-repeatable. These pressures 
detract from in-house lab scientists' ability to 
pursue long-term research projects. 
 
On the other hand, government labs and centers 
during the past decade have actively sought new 
partnerships with the private sector. Driven 
primarily by a need to find additional (non-
government) business to finance their workforce 
and facilities, labs have broken into new areas that 
are not consistent with their traditional priorities or 
with the labs’ prior core competencies. This 
provides them with the potential for flexibility. 
 
Furthermore, because they are part of the 
military itself but are staffed mostly by long-term 
civil servants, government labs possess resilience 
due to organizational longevity and customer 
understanding. However, government labs are less 
successful than FFRDCs or UARCs in attracting 
and retaining top talent because of the constraints 
of the federal civilian employee rules. 
 
Third, private companies have, in recent years, 
led many of the cutting-edge government systems 
integration efforts, whether individually or within 
partnerships. Some efforts have been more 
successful than others, but prime contractors 
clearly have a base of program management 
experience to build on. Given that the government 
business cycle is affected by the annual political 
cycle of Congressional appropriations, industry has 
had to develop the key attribute of flexibility if 
only to incorporate such considerations into their 
business. Similarly, flexibility was developed in 
order to manage relationships with both industry 
partners and sub-contractors. The ability to attract, 
retain and manage top talent from relevant 
technical disciplines also supports this flexibility. 
 
Private companies also possess resilience to a 
great extent. This stems from a high level of 
customer understanding. The ability to grasp 
government jargon and to track emerging policies 
and doctrinal initiatives is developed intensively, 
both through internal training and by hiring retired 
government officials. Furthermore, the need to stay 
commercially viable provides great incentive to 
find ways to adjust to changing conditions. 
 
TABLE II 
FLEXIBILITY AND RESILIENCE IN VARIOUS GOVERNANCE MODELS 
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VI. PRACTICAL MATTERS 
Flexibility and resilience are clearly elements 
of successful governance and management of 
complexity, and they are available to the 
government through each of its current models. To 
be effective, though, F&R needs to be increased at 
each of the three phases in program development: 
 
A. Requirements determination 
Currently, system requirements, once 
formalized, are difficult to change. The process of 
reaching a decision can take several years, making 
any system manager (even if at the cabinet 
secretary level) reluctant to raise questions that 
could cause that process to be restarted. Yet, 
requirements should permit users and developers to 
be smarter today than they were yesterday. System 
design goals should be adjusted accordingly. 
Flexibility in requirements is necessary to promote 
competition and a better alignment of contracts and 
resources.  
 
B. Pre-award (contract preparation) 
The process of converting requirements into an 
RFP, running the bidding and making an award 
must be improved. This pre-award process is the 
government’s way of converting requirements into 
a solicitation document, then seeking bids from 
potential contractors. The process includes the 
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scope of work that will be performed by the 
winning bidders and the criteria for evaluating their 
bids. It also includes the government’s evaluation 
of those bids and selection of the winner or 
winners. In recent years, the results of this pre-
award process have been less successful than in the 
past, as measured by the number of successful 
protests lodged by losing bidders with the GAO. In 
many cases, protests are upheld because of 
procedural flaws by the government in solicitation, 
evaluation, and award of contracts. In some cases, 
good decisions have been undermined by 
governance failures as simple as inadequate 
documentation. Minimizing such process failures is 
necessary for resiliency. Tolerance for adapting to 
changing conditions while maintaining compliance 
with regulations requires both flexibility and 
resilience and will lead to better pre-award efforts.  
 
C. Post-award (contract management) 
The process of managing contracts following 
award needs to be improved. For complex systems, 
this post-award process is hard enough even with 
clear requirements and a pristine pre-award 
process, because the tasks under contract are 
challenging and difficult to achieve. Yet the quality 
and quantity of post-award personnel, the contract 
administration organizations, has been dramatically 
reduced since 1990, and the process of restoring 
them has yet to begin. This is an area where private 
sector best practices in F&R are most applicable, as 
government organizations adapt to changes in 
technology, threats and responses. 
 
VII. SUMMARY 
Innovations in products and services co-evolve 
alongside new forms of governance, management 
and organizational structures. However, the recent 
track record proves that the government’s existing 
tools no longer suffice for large-scale, horizontally 
integrated complex programs, as many  of these 
programs exhibit cost overruns, schedule slippages 
and other developmental setbacks. This is the result 
of two parallel trends: the government’s decreasing 
ability to manage large technology development 
programs in-house (due in part to a stagnation in 
thinking about management models, but also to the 
government’s outsourcing of engineering and 
management tasks), and the dramatic increase in 
the complexity of these programs. 
 
Pioneering new policy and governance models 
is only part of the answer, and one that is now 
beginning in earnest via various new research 
efforts. We propose two other elements of the 
solution. The first is tools for comparing the 
various new governance and management models 
that are currently emerging, such as measuring 
access to information and knowledge. The second 
is tools for offsetting the risk inherent in selecting 
any type of governance or management model by 
embedding the ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances into the organization. Increasing an 
organization’s flexibility and resilience to the 
uncertainty and change inherent in complex 
programs increases an organization’s capacity to 
manage those programs.  
 
What is now needed is for governments to play 
a greater part in developing and implementing new 
knowledge on new governance models, ways of 
comparing them, and ways of increasing 
organizational F&R. While there is much to be 
learned from the private sector, we cannot afford to 
be dependent on it for the next generation of 




[1]    G Ben-Ari and P. Chao, Organizing for a 
Complex World: Developing Tomorrow’s Defense 
and Net-Centric Systems, Washington, DC: CSIS, 
2009. 
[2]    R. Nelson, “What enables rapid economic 
progress: what are the needed institutions?” 
Research Policy, vol. 37:1, pp. 1-11, Winter 2008.  
[3]  Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Integrating Commercial Systems into the DOD, 
Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule 
Benefits for Defense Systems, Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2009, p. 30. 
[4]   Government Accountability Office (2009) 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Weapon Programs, Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office. 
[5]    David Berteau (2009) “Foreword,” in Guy 
Ben-Ari and Pierre Chao (eds.) Organizing for a 
Complex World: Developing Tomorrow’s Defense 
and Net-Centric Systems, Washington, DC: CSIS, 
p. ix. 
[6]     D. Schön Beyond the Stable State: Public 
and Private Learning in a Changing Society, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 28. 
 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Georgia Institute of Technology. Downloaded on January 4, 2010 at 14:12 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
